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attention to the work of the rear. Zakharov
38th parallel. Despite the gravity of the
the Political Council concurred that after the
98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN
pleading for help [Document #6]. Actually,
could not be more explicit than that. Recog-
forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if
the letter was dated September 29. The next
nizing that they could not survive on their
they did cross the parallel, the remaining
day, Pak Hon-Yong personally delivered it
own, they were crying out for help to Stalin,
KPA units would not be able to render any
to Shtykov with an emotional plea that “at
their “fatherly leader,” for, preferably, the
serious resistance, and, consequently, the
the moment of the enemy’s troops crossing
Soviet cavalry to rescue the day, or, if not, to
war would be over in a very short period of
of the 38th parallel, we will desperately need
broker Mao’s consent to enter the war.
time, with the North Korean state being
ground troops from the Soviet Union.” The
In the meantime, on September 29,
eliminated by the aggressive American im-
letter arrived at the Eighth Department of the
General MacArthur restored the Govern-
perialists. Unanimously, the North Korean
General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces on
ment of the Republic of Korea headed by
leadership agreed to ask both allies, the
September 30, at 23:30 p.m., by wire as
Syngman Rhee in an emotional ceremony in
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
“very urgent,” was deciphered on October 1,
the capital in Seoul. The last hope that the
China, for direct military assistance. The
at 0:35 a.m., typed up at 1:45 a.m., and
war could be contained at the status quo ante
Political Council thus discussed and ap-
forwarded to Stalin to his dacha in the South
belli was dashed when later that day the U.S.
proved two official letters [Document #6]
at 2:50 a.m. The timing is important in this
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved
addressed to Stalin and Mao Zedong, beg-
case because only after having received Kim
MacArthur’s plan for the conquest of North
ging them to intervene directly and without
Il Sung’s plea for help did Stalin dispatch a
Korea, envisioning the Eighth Army ad-
delay to save the North Korean regime.
cable to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on
vancing to Pyongyang and the Tenth Corps
It is noteworthy that the next day, before
October 1, at 3:00 a.m., requesting China’s
being withdrawn from the Inch’on-Seoul
dispatching the letter to Stalin, Kim solicited
direct intervention in the Korean conflict.
area for another amphibious landing at
Shtykov’s advice regarding its content and
In their letter, Kim and Pak informed
Wonsan. The same day, U.S. Secretary of
advisability. On the evening of September
Stalin about the severe consequences for the
Defense Gen. George C. Marshall sent an
29, following the mandate of the WPK CC
KPA of the Inch’on landing. Although still
encouraging message to MacArthur: “We
Politburo, Kim for the first time officially
loathe to admit that Seoul had fallen, they
want you to feel unhampered strategically
raised to his Soviet military advisers the
indicated that the enemy “had the real possi-
and tactically to proceed north of the 38th
question of the UN forces’ crossing the 38th
bility of taking over Seoul.” They were
Parallel.”25
parallel. At his meeting with Shtykov and
certain that “with the complete occupation
On September 30, the Soviet Politburo
Zakharov [Document #5], with Pak Hon-
of Seoul, the enemy would launch a further
conferred again on the Korean situation, in
Yong present, he asked Shtykov whether the
offensive into North Korea.” Kim and Pak
particular Zakharov’s latest report on the
latter thought the enemy would dare to cross
admitted that “if the enemy were to take
dire military situation [Document #4]. The
the 38th parallel. Once Shtykov replied that
advantage of the situation and step up its
discussion focused on the need to avoid a
he was not sure, Kim concurred by saying
offensive in North Korea, then we would be
direct military confrontation between the
that “it was not clear to me either.” Kim
unable to stop the enemy by our own forces...
USSR and the United States and the options
added, however, that “if the enemy did cross
and the U.S. aggression would succeed in
still available to salvage the situation in
the parallel, the People’s Army would not be
the end.” Nonetheless, they emphasized that
Korea, including soliciting Chinese help and
able to form new troops and, therefore, would
they were still determined to fight on, to
opening a last-ditch diplomatic maneuver-
not be able to render any serious resistance
mobilize new troops and to prepare “for a
ing at the United Nations. The Politburo
to the enemy forces.” Kim told Shtykov he
protracted war.” They argued that it was “in
directed that the Foreign Ministry draft a
wanted his advice as to how they should
the USSR’s national interest to prevent the
new ceasefire resolution to be submitted to
approach Stalin concerning their letter re-
U.S. advance into North Korea and the latter’s
the UN. Also, they decided to approve Kim
questing direct Soviet military assistance.
transformation into a colony and military
Il Sung’s proposals to reorganize the KPA
But Shtykov dodged the question, obviously
springboard of U.S. imperialism.”
high military command, form six new divi-
to ensure that the final decision to invite
Finally, they begged Stalin for a “spe-
sions, and withdraw remaining North Ko-
Soviet troops to the defense of North Ko-
cial kind of assistance,” admitting that “at
rean troops from the South [Document #8].
rea—and subsequent responsibility, should
the moment when the enemy troops begin to
At the same time, the Politburo decided that
things go wrong—would rest with Kim Il
cross the 38th parallel, we would desper-
armaments, munition, and other materials
Sung and Pak Hon-Yong themselves.23 Kim
ately need direct military assistance from the
for the new divisions would be supplied to
and Pak were visibly dissatisfied and upset
Soviet Union.” Afraid of their plea being
the KPA between October 5 and 20.26 Fi-
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