[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
General. A close relationship had developed, and now spanned the fifteen
intervening years. After retiring as a full colonel five years later, John had
been called back to duty twice.
The first time was to serve during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, where he
had served as an advisor to the commander of the 4thInfantry Division. That
division had planned to assault Iraq from the North, while the 1stMarine
Expeditionary and U.S. Army 3rdInfantry Division invaded from the south. Due
to the inability to secure entry and staging rights in Turkey, the 4thInfantry
Division had ultimately transited the Mediterranean Sea, through the Suez
Canal and entered Iraq by way of the Persian Gulf and Kuwait, several weeks
behind the Marines and the 3rdInfantry Division. They had come along just in
time to relieve the 3rdInfantry Division and in time to essentially mop-up
after the quick and decisive victory of their comrades. A few fire fights and
a lot of patrolling and maintaining of order had ensued, but ultimately, after
a few months, John was released and returned home to his family.
He once again went into retirement from military service, but John Bowers
service to his nation was not over. General Weisskopf himself, now President
Weisskopf, had made the next call. He simply and directly asked John Bowers to
serve as his National Security Advisor and to help him ensure that
American interests were not only protected, but clearly articulated throughout
an increasingly threatening world, particularly in the Western Pacific.
So, here he was, surveying the attendees of a meeting, which would prepare a
presentation to the
President of the United States and the Joint Chiefs the following day. The
assembled group included Tom
Lawton and Bill Hendrickson from the NRO, Captain Toby Skip Pendleton from
US Navy
Generated by ABC Amber LIT Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abclit.html
Intelligence, Major Tim Lawrence from the US Air Force, and Susan Theigold
from the US State
Department.
Okay, let s get this show on the road, shall we? It is my understanding that
the photographs and data from the over-flight have been analyzed by everyone
here and that preliminary notes, concerns and projections from that analysis
by the NRO, the Navy and the Air Force have been copied to and reviewed by you
all. Is that correct?
John looked around the room, receiving either a nod or a simple Yes or
That s correct from everyone there.
Alright then, that s excellent. Let s go ahead and start with the NRO and
proceed from there right around the table, having the Navy, the Air Force and
the State Department make their statements in turn.
Please try to keep each of your opening comments to 3 5 minutes. We ll have
plenty of time for detailed interaction after we hear from each of you. We ll
wrap up the meeting with an hour-long session of developing final thoughts as
Page 24
ABC Amber Palm Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abcpalm.html
to the meaning and ramifications of this info and what we believe we should do
about it, beginning at 3:30 p.m. Bill, will you or Tom please begin?
Bill nodded to Tom and indicated, according to their prior decision, for Tom
to take point in this discussion.
Okay, Mr. Bowers, I will be presenting our thoughts on the over-flight. As
you all know, on March
25thlocal time, March 24thhere, we conducted and over-flight in international
airspace off the coast of
Southern China. Our aim was to take a hard look at six airfields where our
satellite assets had shown us pictures of what appeared to be the PLAN
training large numbers of naval aircraft.
Two things were intriguing: first, the number of apparent airfields being
used for this activity, and second, the configuration of the airfield
facilities so employed.
Simply stated, in terms of SIGINT and visible data, our over-flight
absolutely confirmed the existence of these facilities and the way in which
they are being employed. The data also indicates that the Red
Chinese are indeed training between six and eight mixed carrier wings
consisting of fighter, strike and even what appears to be a new Airborne
Early Warning (AEW) aircraft in addition to the two wings they are training
near Shanghai. Also, it is clear that they are training these air wings with a
deck configuration that is not similar to the layout of the two carriers they
are building in Shanghai. We will save our thoughts on ramifications and on
reasoning for later in the meeting.
As he sat down, Bill Hendrickson quickly interjected, I would like to add
here what Tom is too modest to let you know: that is, that it was his own
analysis that led to the discovery of the installations which led to the
over-flight itself. Our analysis, particularly after the mission, indicates
many more air wings being trained than conceivably necessary for the carriers
the Chinese are building.
As Bill sat down, John looked directly at Tom while stating, Okay, okay.
Thanks very much to our friends from the NRO. Tom, you did a fine job in
ferreting this out. Oh, by the way, I would like the two of you, Bill and Tom,
to be in attendance at the meeting tomorrow for backup when we discuss all of
this.
Then, looking over to Toby Pendleton, John continued. So, without further
pause, let s continue. Please
Toby, what are the US Navy s thoughts on the data?
For the next three hours, the Navy, the Air Force and the State Department
first made their initial
Generated by ABC Amber LIT Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abclit.html
statements, which to one degree or another basically concurred with the NRO,
and then discussed the issues in detail. The fallout of the entire discussion
was simply that:
The Red Chinese were training a lot more Naval Air capability than would be
indicated by the capacity of the carriers they were building.
The configuration of the training facilities targeted by this surveillance was
strange, and not understood, as it represented a somewhat shorter deck in an
X configuration, as opposed to the longer and more traditional angled
configuration building on the new carriers in Shanghai.
The only possible conclusions, given the investment in the unexplained
efforts, were that the Chinese were planning on building additional carriers,
without divulging any indication to that effect.
The recommendation was to conduct further surveillance, to consider bringing
up the question through diplomatic channels and to consider using human
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]